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The term “vicarious liability” is a curious one.  The word “vicarious” is defined in the Oxford 
English Dictionary as “acting or done for another”, from the Latin vicarius meaning substitute.1  
Pollock claims to have invented the term “vicarious liability” in the 1880s,2 but its roots lie far 
earlier, for example, it can be traced to early medieval ideas of identification of a master with 
the acts of its servants, and the personal liability of the Roman paterfamilias for the delicts of 
his child or slave. For Chief Justice Holt in 1691, it was already clear that “for whoever employs 
another is answerable for him and undertakes for his care to all that make use of him.”3  For 
the drafters of the French Civil Code in 1804, it was also obvious that “Masters and employers 
[are liable] for the damage occasioned by their servants and employees in the exercise of the 
functions in which they are employed.”4  While French law prefers the more inclusive (and 
simpler) term of “liability for the acts of others” (responsabilité pour autrui), the idea is 
nevertheless the same.  In certain situations, one person will be held (strictly) liable for the torts 
of another.  Instead of, or in addition to, suing the tortfeasor, then, the claimant can pursue 
another party for tortious damages.  This other need not have been at fault, but is more likely 
to possess the funds to provide compensation.  It is a doctrine which crosses legal systems and 
yet is at odds with the idea of fault-based liability which has traditionally dominated the law of 
torts.5   
In this paper, I will explore vicarious liability from a comparative law perspective.  Such a 
perspective, it will be argued, can provide an insight into both the operation of tort law 
principle, but also the values and policy objectives which underlie legal development.   I will 
do so by examining its operation across a variety of legal cultures which may alternatively be 
described as: common/civil law; European/Australasian/Chinese; Western/Socialist; 
established/transitional – focussing on the law of England and Wales, Australia, Hong Kong, 
China and France.  Two points of comparison will be made: (i) what legal structure exists and 
(ii) what policy goals underlie this legal structure?  Studying comparative vicarious liability, it 
will be argued, helps us gain a clearer appreciation of the role private law plays in our societies 
in responding to economic development and the needs of personal injury victims. 
 
 
                                                          
1 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/vicarious  (accessed 7 August 2018).   
2 See O.W. Holmes, Holmes-Pollock Letters (CUP, 1941) vol I, p. 233. 
3 Boson v Sandford (1691) 2 Salk 440, 91 ER 382.   
4  Article 1384(5), now article 1242(5): modified by Ordonnance n°2016-131, 10 February 2016 - art. 2.  
Translation: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Traductions/Liste-des-traductions-Legifrance  (accessed 7 August 
2018).   
5 See F. Werro and E. Büyüksagis, ‘The boundaries between negligence and strict liability’ in M.  Bussani and A. 
J. Sebok (eds), Comparative Tort Law: Global Perspectives (Edward Elgar, 2015) 202; U. Magnus, ‘Tort law in 
general’ in J.M. Smits (ed), Edward Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (2nd edn, Edward Elgar, 2012) at 
878. See also P. Widmer (ed), Unification of Tort Law: Fault (Kluwer, 2005). For the tensions vicarious liability 
causes to corrective justice and rights-based reasoning, see E.J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Harvard U 
Press, 1995) 186f; R. Stevens, Torts and Rights (OUP, 2007) Ch 11.   
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2. Placing vicarious liability in comparative perspective: The common law of 
England and Wales, Australia, Hong Kong.  
The traditional common law definition of vicarious liability consists of three conditions: (1) an 
employer (or master) who is held strictly liable; (2) for the torts of his employee (or servant); 
(3) provided that they take place in the course of employment.6  The classic test of Sir John 
Salmond, which was applied to claims across the common law world including former British 
colonies Australia and Hong Kong, states that: 
A master is not responsible for a wrongful act done by his servant unless it is done in the course of his employment.  
It is deemed to be so done if it is either (1) a wrongful act authorised by his master, or (2) a wrongful and 
unauthorised mode of doing some act authorised by the master.7 
As the twentieth century progressed, it became clear that vicarious liability would have to 
change if it was to remain relevant to modern working practices.  In 1951, Sir Otto Kahn-
Freund observed that: 
In a mainly agricultural society and even in the earlier stages of the Industrial Revolution the master could be 
expected to be superior to the servant in the knowledge. Skill and experience which had to be brought to bear 
upon the choice and handling of the tools …. The technical and economic developments of all industrial societies 
have nullified these assumptions.8 
Modern employment relations have thus forced the courts to review the traditional 
requirements for vicarious liability and, in particular, re-examine what we mean by the 
“employer/employee” relationship and the “course of employment” test. 
 
2.1 Determining the employer/employee relationship 
Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-1769) famously stated that “the 
master is answerable for the act of his servant, if done by his command, either expressly given, 
or implied.”9  The employment relationship was thus characterised as one where the master 
could control the servant’s work and instruct the servant what work to undertake and how to 
do it.  Bramwell LJ in Yewens v Noakes in 1880 agreed: “A servant is a person subject to the 
command of his master as to the manner in which he shall do the work”.10   
Such a view of the employment relationship did not survive the industrial revolution.  As 
“masters” became large-scale employers and “servants” faceless employees, all three systems 
modified the test for the employment relationship to reflect changes in employment practices 
and, in particular, the rise of the skilled professional employee capable of working 
independently without constant supervision.  Justice Michael Kirby in 1989 re-iterated the view 
expressed by Kahn-Freund above: 
                                                          
6 Vicarious liability does extend to other relationships e.g. partners in a law firm, but the employer/employee 
relationship is the most common incidence of the doctrine.  On this basis, it is this relationship which will be 
examined in this article. 
7 J. Salmond, The Law of Torts (1st ed, Stevens and Haynes 1907) 83 (later found in R. Heuston and R. Buckley, 
Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Tort (21st ed, Sweet and Maxwell 1996) 443). 
8 O. Kahn-Freund, ‘Servants and independent contractors’ (1951) 14 M.L.R. 504, 505-6. 
9 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England (W. Morrison (ed), Cavendish, 2001) vol 1, 429. 
10 (1880) 6 Q.B.D. 530, 532-3. 
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 … [t]he simple "control" test [is] no longer considered adequate to determine the relationship of an employer and 
employee given advances in education, technology, the role of the modem corporation and social changes which 
necessarily enhance individual autonomy.11  
As social conditions change, then so does vicarious liability.  In the leading English case of 
Market Investigations v Minister of Social Security,12 Cooke J acknowledged that the time had 
come to acknowledge that while control would often be relevant, it was no longer a sole 
determining factor for determining an employment relationship.  In a judgment which shows 
an exemplary command of developments in the common law world, Cooke J noted concerns 
expressed in Australia, 13  United States 14 and in the Privy Council 15  that the test for the 
employment relationship needed to take account of the substance of the parties’ relationship 
and look at matters such as whether the worker provides his own equipment, hires his own 
helpers, whether he is likely to profit personally and the degree of financial risk he takes, in 
addition to that of control.  This fact-based economic reality test has since been adopted across 
the common law world.16 
 
The application of the test across English, Australian and Hong Kong law is revealing.17  The 
leading English case of Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions and 
National Insurance18 demonstrates clearly that modern working relationships often do not offer 
a clear delineation between “employees” and “independent contractors” to whom vicarious 
liability does not apply.  Here, the workers were lorry drivers, delivering concrete for the 
defendant company.  The vehicles were owned by the workers, but paid for via a finance 
organisation associated with the company, painted in company colours, and the drivers were 
obliged to wear the company uniform.  They equally had to obtain the company’s permission 
to hire a replacement driver and were prohibited from operating as a carrier of goods except 
under contract. They were paid, however, at mileage rates under a contract which expressly 
declared them to be independent contractors.  The court took the view that, on balance, the 
owner-drivers were “small business men”, who owned their own assets and incurred both the 
chance of profit and the risk of loss.  The defendant company would therefore not have been 
found vicariously liable for their actions. 
 
Today, then, the task for the courts is to divide entrepreneurs from workers employed in the 
‘gig’ economy and often labelled “independent contractors” to minimise the outgoings of the 
employer in terms of tax, sick pay and state insurance contributions.  The decision of the High 
Court of Australia decision in Hollis v Vabu19  illustrates well the difficulties facing the courts 
in identifying which relationships should give rise to vicarious liability.  Here Mr Hollis had 
been injured by a negligent bicycle courier identifiable only by his uniform which bore the 
name of the owners of the courier business–the defendant. Those familiar with the Deliveroo 
                                                          
11 Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital (1989) 17 NSWLR 553 per Kirby J. at 563.   
12 [1969] 2 Q.B. 173, 184-185.   
13 Queensland Stations Proprietary Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1945) 70 C.L.R. 539, the "drover" 
case. 
14 United States of America v Silk 331 U.S. 704 (1946) . 
15 Montreal v. Montreal Locomotive Works Ltd [1947] 1 D.L.R. 161. 
16 See, for example, Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Company Pty Ltd (1986) 160 C.L.R. 16 (Australia), 671122 
Ontario Ltd v Sagaz Industries Canada Inc [2001] SCR 983 (Canada) and Lee Ting Sang v Chung Chi-keung 
[1990] 2 A.C. 374 (Hong Kong). 
17 See, generally, E. McKendrick, ‘Vicarious Liability and Independent Contractors – a Re-examination’ (1990) 
53 M.L.R. 770; R Kidner, ‘Vicarious Liability: for whom should the employer be liable?’ (1995) 15 L.S. 47. 
18 [1968] 2 Q.B. 497. 
19 (2001) 207 C.L.R. 21. 
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cyclists who wind their way through the streets of major cities will be aware of both the concept 
and the dangers over-burdened cyclists riding at speed can cause to pedestrians and, indeed, 
any other road-users.  As in Ready Mixed Concrete, there were factors supporting both 
independent contractor and employee status. The couriers were paid by fixed rates per job, 
required to use their own bicycles and were able to deal with the company as sole traders or 
members of a partnership. However, they wore uniforms, were provided with radio equipment 
by the company and were allocated jobs by radio. The company provided strict instructions 
concerning dress, appearance, language, delivery procedures and dealing with clients, and 
undertook the provision of insurance for the couriers (deducting the amounts from their wages). 
The majority20 of the High Court of Australia found the couriers to be employees of the 
company for whom it was vicariously liable. The high degree of control exercised by Vabu 
over unskilled labourers, combined with the limited investment involved in purchasing a 
bicycle useable for leisure activities as well (as opposed to a large lorry) combined with the 
fact that the uniformed couriers were presented to the public as emanations of Vabu, convinced 
the majority that they should be treated as employees.  Such an approach reflects the realities 
of modern employment practices (and their impact on tort victims).  In the words of McHugh 
J, “Rather than attempting to force new types of work arrangements into the so-called 
employee/independent contractor ‘dichotomy’ based on medieval concepts of servitude, it 
seems a better approach to develop the principles concerning vicarious liability in a way that 
gives effect to modern social conditions.”21 
Similar tensions have arisen in Hong Kong.  Prior to 1997, tort law in Hong Kong had dutifully 
followed English precedents with infrequent appeals to the Privy Council which, with a few 
minor exceptions, clarified existing law rather than breaking new ground.22 However, with the 
establishment of a new Court of Final Appeal in 1997, the possibility arose for a distinctive 
Hong Kong common law of tort.  Under the Basic Law of Hong Kong, the common law 
continues to be applicable post-handover,23  but the courts are now free to refer to precedents 
from any common law jurisdiction.24  In relation to vicarious liability, the Privy Council 
decision in Lee Ting Sang v Chung Chi-keung,25 which had accepted that Hong Kong law 
should adopt the approach of Cooke J. in Market Investigations Ltd. v Minister of Social 
Security, is still followed.   In Poon Chau Nam v Yim Siu Cheung in 2007,26 the court faced a 
compensation claim from an air-conditioning technician who had been injured when the 
welding electrode rod he was using suddenly broke, severely injuring his left eye.  On the facts, 
the plaintiff had been the only casual worker employed by the defendant and his wages had 
                                                          
20 Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ in a joint judgment. McHugh J concurred in the result 
but not the reasoning. Callinan J dissenting. 
21 Hollis v Vabu (n 19), [72].  See also Mason J in Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16, 
28 f. 
22 See R. Glofcheski, ‘Tort law’ in S.N.M. Young and Y. Ghai (eds), Hong Kong's Court of Final Appeal: The 
Development of the Law in China's Hong Kong (CUP, 2013) 524.  The four cases he regards as of lasting 
importance are Edward Wong Finance Co. Ltd v. Johnson Stokes & Master [1984] A.C. 296 (standard of care of 
solicitors in their duty to clients); Yuen Kun Yeu v. A-G of Hong Kong [1988] A.C. 175 (Government regulators 
duty of care to bank depositors); Ng Chun-pui v. Lee Chuen-tat [1988] 2 H.K.L.R. 425 (effect of the application 
of res ipsa loquitur); and Lee Ting-sang v. Chung Chi-keung [1990] 1 H.K.L.R. 764 (requirements for a contract 
of service). 
23 Article 8 BL. 
24 Article 84, BL. 
25 [1990] 2 A.C. 374, 382 per Lord Griffiths.  
26 (2007) 10 HKCFAR 156.  This was an employer’s compensation claim under the Employees’ Compensation 
Ordinance.   
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been calculated on a daily basis, with no employer contribution to the mandatory provident 
fund.  He filled in a time sheet every day after work, stating the working hours and place for 
the calculation of wages, overtime allowance and travelling expenses.  He was provided with 
tools when needed.  In overturning the negative rulings of the lower courts, the Court of Final 
Appeal (CFA) found a number of indicia of employment: the defendant owned the business in 
question and decided which, if any, jobs should be assigned to the plaintiff, paying him at a 
daily rate. All the profits and losses of the business were for the defendant’s account with the 
plaintiff bearing no financial risks and reaping no financial rewards beyond his daily-rated 
remuneration.  Equipment was owned by the defendant and not the plaintiff.  Essentially, then, 
the plaintiff worked alongside other workers as an employee; the only real difference being 
that his employment was of a casual nature whereas theirs was permanent and paid on a 
monthly basis. In the words of Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ: 
The modern approach to the question whether one person is another’s employee is therefore to examine all the 
features of their relationship against the background of the indicia developed in the abovementioned case-law 
with a view to deciding whether, as a matter of overall impression, the relationship is one of employment, bearing 
in mind the purpose for which the question is asked.27 
Glofcheski has noted, however, a difference in the typical tort litigant in Hong Kong: he will 
be an injured worker who is almost always successful at the end of the appeal process either 
because of the court’s sympathetic interpretation of the facts or in some cases because of the 
court’s flexible interpretation or incremental development of the law.28  On this basis, the 
courts have maintained a generous approach to the question of employee status and sought to 
develop a more rigorous standard that employers must follow in providing safe working 
conditions for their employees.   
Yet while consensus exists in developing a broader notion of the employment relationship, 
there remains disagreement as to whether the relationship should extend to informal working 
relationships “akin to employment” which are becoming more common with the disintegration 
of traditional employment relationships and the casualisation of labour.29 In JGE (or E) v 
English Province of Our Lady of Charity,30 the English Court of Appeal accepted that priests 
(who are office-holders and not employees) could be described as “akin to employees” and 
would then be brought within the scope of the doctrine of vicarious liability.  The leading UK 
Supreme Court decision of Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society (CCWS)31 
confirmed that while the vast majority of cases would relate to relationships under a contract 
of employment, the courts should examine whether the individual tortfeasor “was working on 
behalf of an enterprise or on his own behalf and, if the former, how central the workman’s 
activities were to the enterprise and whether these activities were integrated into the 
organisational structure of the enterprise.” 32   This approach has been followed in Cox v 
                                                          
27 Ibid., [18]. 
28 Glofcheski (n 22) 526. 
29 See H. Collins, ‘Independent contractors and the challenge of vertical disintegration to employment protection 
law’ (1990) 10 OJLS 353; J. Prassl, The Concept of the Employer (OUP, 2015). 
30 [2012] EWCA Civ 938, [2013] Q.B. 722. It also extends to ministerial servants: A v The Trustees of the 
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society and others [2015] EWHC 1722 (QB).   
31 [2012] UKSC 56; [2013] 2 A.C. 1 at [35]. 
32 CCWS ibid., [49] per Lord Phillips.   
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Ministry of Justice33 and Armes v Nottinghamshire CC,34 where the Supreme Court expanded 
further the range of relationships which could be described as “akin to employment” to include 
a prisoner working in a prison kitchen and a foster parent caring for children on behalf of a 
local authority.35  Hong Kong has yet to cross the line into “akin to employment”, although 
recent case-law does indicate that it is likely to follow.  Its courts have accepted the relevance 
of the CCWS/Cox principle, even if it is currently being circumspectly applied.36  The recent 
case of Tsoi Wing Yuk v Perfect Marble Company Ltd37 while denying vicarious liability on 
the facts, did use the CCWS/Cox test to examine whether the negligent marble worker had 
carried out activities “as an integral part of the business activities carried out by a defendant 
and for its benefit”.  On the facts, he had not.  
However, Australia continues to reject such an approach.  This is despite attempts by Justice 
McHugh to put forward a similar idea of a “representative agent” in cases such as Hollis itself,38 
which would have extended vicarious liability to some independent contractors.39  Leeming 
J.A. in Day v The Ocean Beach Hotel Shellharbour Pty Ltd asserted that, until the High Court 
determines otherwise, the distinction between independent contractors and employees is 
regarded in Australia as a basic proposition central to the law relating to vicarious liability, 
which is “too deeply rooted to be pulled out”.40 Such an approach was also adopted in the 
clergy abuse case of Trustees of Roman Catholic Church v Ellis;41 the Court rejecting on that 
basis a claim by a plaintiff, who had been sexually abused by an assistant priest, that the Roman 
Catholic Archdiocese of Sydney was vicariously liable for the abuse. 
 
2.2 A broader course of employment test? 
Vicarious liability also requires that the tort is committed in the course of employment.  Serious 
criminal misconduct, such as the sexual abuse, had previously been found not to satisfy the 
Salmond test in that it could not be described as conduct “authorised by the master or 
amounting to a wrongful and unauthorised mode of doing some act authorised by the master.”42  
The UK House of Lords, however, in 2001 in Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd43 overturned this test for 
                                                          
33 [2016] UKSC 10, [2016] A.C. 660. 
34 [2017] UKSC 60, [2018] A.C. 355.  See also the recent Court of Appeal decision in Barclays Bank plc v Various 
Claimants [2018] EWCA Civ 1670 where Irwin L.J. commented that while a “bright line” test dividing employee 
and independent contractor would make easier the conduct of business for parties and their insurers, ease of 
application would not be permitted displace or circumvent the principles now established by the Supreme Court: 
[61].  
35 See also Canada: in John Doe v Bennett [2004] 1 SCR 436 the court held that the relationship between a bishop 
and a priest in a diocese was “akin to an employment relationship”, inasmuch as the priest took a vow of obedience 
to the bishop, the bishop exercised extensive control over the priest, including the power of assignment, the power 
to remove the priest from his post and the power to discipline him. See K. Calitz, ‘The liability of churches for 
the historical sexual assault of children by priests’ (2014) 17(6) PER: Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad, 
2452.  For the influence of Bennett on UK law, see D. Tan, ‘A sufficiently close relationship akin to employment’ 
(2013) 129 L.Q.R. 30. 
36 R. Glofcheski, Tort Law in Hong Kong (4th ed., Sweet and Maxwell 2017) 488.  
37  [2016] HKEC 818, [64]-[66], Deputy High Court Judge Marlene Ng.  See also Talat Zahid v Cheung Fat Metal 
Trading Ltd [2017] HKEC 1297. 
38 Hollis (n 19), [93].  See also Scott v Davis [2000] HCA 52, [34].   
39 Rejected by the majority of the High Court in Sweeney v Boylan Nominees Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 19, (2006) 226 
C.L.R. 161 and Scott v Davis [2000] HCA 52, (2000) 204 C.L.R. 333. 
40 [2013] NSWCA 250, (2013) 85 NSWLR 335, [14], quoting Sweeney v Boylan Nominees Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 
19, (2006) 226 C.L.R. 161, [12] and [33]. 
41 (2007) 70 NSWLR 565, [2007] NSWCA 117.   
42 Trotman v North Yorkshire County Council [1999] L.G.R. 584. 
43 [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 A.C. 215. 
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intentional torts such as abuse, favouring a test of “close connection”: an employer would be 
held vicariously liable for the intentional torts of his employees where the commission of the 
tort was so closely connected to the employment that it would be fair and just to hold the 
employer vicariously liable.44  This “close connection” test was inspired by the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s decision in Bazley v Curry,45 which had accepted that vicarious liability would 
generally be appropriate where there is a significant connection between the creation or 
enhancement of a risk and the wrong that accrues therefrom, even if unrelated to the employer’s 
desires.  This could be justified on the basis that the imposition of vicarious liability would 
serve the policy considerations of the provision of an adequate and just remedy and of 
deterrence. Subsequent decisions of the UK Supreme Court have followed the Lister approach 
and urged the need for the course of employment test to be applied broadly, in relation to both 
negligence and intentional torts.  In 2016, Lord Toulson in Mohamud v WM Morrison 
Supermarkets plc46 stated that in future the court should focus on two questions: 
 
i. What functions or field of activities had been entrusted by the employer to the employee 
(or, in everyday language, what was the nature of the employee's job)? and 
ii. Was there a sufficient connection between the position in which the employee is 
employed and his wrongful conduct which would make it “right” for the employer to 
be held liable as a matter of social justice? 47 
 
The Supreme Court, on this basis, was prepared to accept that a racist attack on a customer by 
a shop worker was sufficiently within the broad field of the activities entrusted to the employee 
to satisfy the “course of employment” test.  Khan had been employed to attend to customers 
and respond to their enquiries.  His violent assault was characterised simply as a foul mouthed 
and violent means of undertaking the “field of activities” assigned to him. 
Bearing in mind the radical nature of such developments, it is of interest that the Hong Kong 
Court of Final Appeal in Ming An Insurance Co (HK) Ltd v Ritz-Carlton Ltd applied not only 
the Lister test, but confirmed that it would be applicable to both negligence and intentional 
torts in 2002. (At the time, this was far from clear in English law).  The case involved a hotel 
doorman using one of the hotel’s limousines to get food for himself and his colleagues.  He 
drove negligently and seriously injured two pedestrians.  Bokhary PJ, giving the lead judgment, 
endorsed the reasoning of Lord Steyn in Lister and McLachlin J in Bazley v Curry.  He adopted 
a straightforward approach to the test: 
By “close connection” is meant a connection between the employee’s unauthorised tortious act and his 
employment which is so close as to make it fair and just to hold his employer vicariously liable. I consider close 
connection to be an intellectually satisfying and practical criterion for vicarious liability. It imposes vicarious 
liability when, but only when, it would be fair and just to do so … The concept is a simple one which ought not 
to be complicated by reading other requirements into it. 48 
Here, there was a practice of collecting food for staff (particularly when the canteen was closed) 
which benefited not only staff, but also the hotel to ensure its staff were adequately fed.  The 
                                                          
44 Lister [2001] UKHL 22, [28] (Lord Steyn). 
45 (1999) 174 DLR (4th) 45, [1].  Bazley also concerned the question of vicarious liability for sexual abuse of a 
child in a residential care facility. 
46 [2016] UKSC 11, [2016] A.C. 677.  
47 Mohamud ibid., [44]-[45] per Lord Toulson. 
48 [2002] HKLRD 844 at [19] and [24] per Bokhary PJ.  Applied in Li Hoi Shuen v Man Ming Engineering Trading 
[2006] HKCFI 53, [2006] 1 HKLRD 84 (murder by co-worker not closely connected to employment); Ling Man 
Kuen v Chow Chan Ming [2006] HKEC 1566 (assault by supervisor closely connected to employment). 
8 
 
doorman was also authorised to drive hotel limousines, for example if they obstructed the hotel 
forecourt for other vehicles.  On this basis, it would be fair and just to hold the hotel vicariously 
liable.  
This decision was followed by the HK Court of Appeal in 2015 in Yeung Mei Hoi v Tam Cheuk 
Shing,49 applying the close connection test to a fight between two employees working as 
security guards in a residential estate managed by the second defendant.  Here,  Tam had sworn 
at Yeung and hit him with his fist, striking at Yeung's head with a walkie-talkie.  The Court 
held that having put a system of supervision and discipline in place, there was an inherent risk 
that an employee might react in an unauthorized way, such as swearing and assault, when 
criticised by the plaintiff (his supervisor) for his performance as a security guard.  More 
recently, in Chan Shek Ho v Shiu Ho Chi,50 the Court of First Instance found an assault by the 
defendant’s employee (a warehouse worker) on a truck driver while he was unloading goods 
at a warehouse to be closely connected with his employment.  The court confirmed that: 
 
 … in applying the "close connection" criterion, the concept of employment must be viewed broadly, and the 
nature of employment is not to be ascertained merely by attempting to tabulate the employee's duties. It is 
necessary to stand back and see how the employer's activities were actually carried out and how that exposed the 
public to the risk of tortious harm caused by the employee.51 
 
Again the adoption of a broad approach seems consistent with developments in the UK 
Supreme Court, notably Mohamud, and highlights the tendency in recent cases towards an 
increasingly liberal protection of innocent third parties.52 
 
In contrast, the High Court of Australia in Prince Alfred College v ADC53 has refused to follow 
the Lister/Mohamud approach, expressly finding Mohamud to be wrongly decided.  In rejecting 
the position of the UK, Hong Kong and Canadian courts as too reliant on general principle and 
policy, the HCA proposed an alternative test of “occasion”.54   Under this, the courts should 
focus on the role given to the employee and the nature of his responsibilities to establish 
whether his employment had been the “occasion” for the commission of the wrongful act.  The 
court would take into account matters such as authority, power, trust, control and the ability to 
achieve intimacy with the victim.  The relevant approach was, therefore, to consider any special 
role that the employer has assigned to the employee and the position in which the employee is 
thereby placed vis-à-vis the victim. In specifying a test of “occasion”, the High Court went 
back to basics: its 1949 decision in Deatons v Flew55  in which Dixon J. asked whether the 
intentional tort was one of those wrongful acts to which the ostensible performance of his 
employer’s work gave “occasion”.56 This is a deliberately narrower formulation to that found 
in UK and Canadian law.  It is fact-specific.  In particular, it requires the plaintiff to identify a 
situation of power-disparity and vulnerability between him and his abuser.  
                                                          
49  [2015] 2 HKLRD 483, [2015] 4 HKC 1. 
50 [2018] HKEC 85, citing Mohamud at [25], 6 April 2018. 
51 Ibid., [21] per Deputy High Court Judge Marlene Ng. 
52 See A. Pang, ‘Yeung Mei Hoi v Tam Cheuk Shing and Enterprise Liability in Tort’ (2016) 10 Hong Kong Journal 
of Legal Studies 135, 138. She argues that if enterprise liability is permitted, the Court of Final Appeal ought to 
identify what the limitations in holding an employer liable are and justify them.  See, in particular, Cheung JA (n 
48) 490-491. 
53 [2016] HCA 37, (2016) 258 C.L.R. 134 
54 Ibid., [81]. 
55 [1949] HCA 60. Deatons was regarded as unjust and wrongly decided in Mohamud: [2016] UKSC 11, [30].  
56 (n 53), [81].  
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2.3 A common law approach to vicarious liability? 
Drawing comparative conclusions from the above analysis, what we see in all three 
jurisdictions is a willingness to recognise that modern vicarious liability must take account of 
changes to employment relationships.  On this basis, the bicycle courier in Hollis and the casual 
worker in Poon Chau Nam who find themselves without the security of a permanent contract 
of employment but obliged nevertheless to work according to the instructions and timetable of 
their employer can be classified as “employees”.  In a world of zero hour contracts, this is to 
be applauded.  Nevertheless, a question remains to what extent vicarious liability should extend 
to the so-called “dependent” contractors, that is, workers who are not technically employees 
but nevertheless play an integral role in the operation of the defendant’s enterprise. Is the 
inclusion of relationships “akin to employment” a logical next step given the precarious nature 
of many modern employment relationships or, as stated by the Australian courts, a step too far?  
It is clear that a test of “employee” based on economic reality must draw the line somewhere, 
but there is not as yet consensus in the common law world where that line should be.   
The “course of employment” test has also changed over time with the UK, Canada and Hong 
Kong adopting a test of “close connection” which leaves much to the discretion of the courts 
and is now accepted to be as applicable to negligence claims as those of intentional torts.  
Commentators have questioned, however, how much guidance Mohamud, Ming An and Yeung 
Mei Hoi provide in determining how “close” a connection must be.  Plunkett and Morgan have 
both criticised the test as overly generous and seeming to apply a test of mere causal 
connection. 57  For Yap, too much emphasis is placed on what fairness and justice require, 
without highlighting that in Bazley the SCC had sought to examine whether there was a 
significant connection between the creation or enhancement of a risk and the wrong in 
question.58  Tan also notes a trend in Hong Kong and Singapore tort law towards a more liberal 
interpretation of the close connection test.59 Much of the Mohamud test seems to rest on how 
the court characterises the facts of the case: is the act of a racist employee shouting abuse at an 
individual entering his employer's premises significantly connected to his concern to remove 
the individual from these premises or simply an act of abuse which he would have committed 
whether he had met the individual in a park or while watching a game of football? Yap and 
Glofcheski have also been critical of the open-textured nature of the test put forward by Justice 
Bokhary in Hong Kong law. 60  Glofcheski, in particular, warns that in failing to pay sufficient 
attention to the distributive effects of this new formulation which threatens a great expansion 
to the scope of employers’ liability, the CFA is moving to a very broad notion of vicarious 
liability with cases traditionally dismissed as “frolic of his own” cases, such as Storey v 
Ashton,61 included in the doctrine.62   
                                                          
57 J. Plunkett, `Taking Stock of Vicarious Liability' (2016) 132 L.Q.R. 556; P. Morgan, ‘Certainty in vicarious 
liability: a quest for a chimaera?’ (2016) 75 C.L.J. 202. See also P. Giliker, ‘Vicarious Liability in the UK Supreme 
Court’ (2016) 7 UK Supreme Court Yearbook 152, 165-166. 
58 P.J. Yap, ‘Enlisting Close Connections: A Matter of Course for Vicarious Liability’ (2008) 28 L.S. 197, 210. 
59 D. Tan, ‘Internalising externalities: An enterprise risk approach to vicarious liability in the 21st century’ (2015) 
27 SALJ 822, 839. 
60 Yap (n 58), 210; Glofcheski (n 22) 537. 
61 (1869) LR 4 QB 476 (delivery driver visiting the home of a colleague’s relative on personal business). 
62 R. Glofcheski, ‘A frolic in the law of tort: Expanding the scope of employers’ vicarious liability’ (2004) 12 Tort 
L Rev 1, 13. 
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For the UK Supreme Court, this more generous approach can be justified by focussing on what 
it identifies as the five underlying policy objectives of vicarious liability, namely:   
(i) the employer is more likely to have the means to compensate the victim than the 
employee and can be expected to have insured against that liability (deeper 
pockets);  
(ii) the tort will have been committed as a result of activity being taken by the employee 
on behalf of the employer (delegation of task);  
(iii) the employee’s activity is likely to be part of the business activity of the employer 
(activity risk);  
(iv) the employer, by employing the employee to carry on the activity will have created 
the risk of the tort committed by the employee (risk creation); and  
(v) the employee will, to a greater or lesser degree, have been under the control of the 
employee (control).63   
While not the sole justification, the growth of vicarious liability does seem to be indelibly tied 
to an acceptance of the internalisation of the risks created by employees connected to their 
work.  This derives from the judgment of McLachlin J in the Canadian case of Bazley v Curry:64  
 
The employer puts in the community an enterprise which carries with it certain risks. When those risks materialize 
and cause injury to a member of the public despite the employer’s reasonable efforts, it is fair that the person or 
organisation that creates the enterprise and hence the risk should bear the loss. 
 
Pure risk theory, however, does not tell us why vicarious liability is placed on the employer 
(not just any risk-creator) and why it is only the risk of tortious (as opposed to any harmful) 
behaviour which gives rise to responsibility for the injury suffered.  McIvor rightly comments 
that “such reasoning could be just as easily be applied to any risk-producing activity that is 
traditionally covered by insurance, most obviously the act of driving.”65 It also does not explain 
how it fits with the otherwise dominant force of the tort of negligence and ideas of corrective 
justice in common law tort law.  It is noticeable that the UK Supreme Court has proven reluctant 
to rely solely on this ground and indeed in Armes, the factors of control and deeper pockets 
were also influential in its analysis.66  Glofcheski also argues that the current position in Hong 
Kong in reality involves an unmitigated search for deeper pockets premised on acceptance by 
the Hong Kong courts of the arguments of enterprise risk.67  Fundamentally, risk-based analysis 
may be relied upon to justify extending vicarious liability, but it fails to provide clear guidance 
on the limits of liability, in particular in determining the closeness of the connection needed to 
establish vicarious liability.68   
                                                          
63 CCWS ibid, [35]. 
64 Bazley v Curry (1999) 174 D.L.R. (4th) 45, 60. See also P.S. Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts 
(Butterworths, 1967) 171: “[t]he master ought to be liable for all those torts which can fairly be regarded as 
reasonably incidental risks to the type of business he carries on” (cited in Lister).  Query whether these two tests 
are the same.  See, generally, D. Brodie, ‘Enterprise liability: Justifying vicarious liability’ (2007) 27 O.J.L.S. 
493. 
65 C. McIvor, 'The Use and Abuse of the Doctrine of Vicarious Liability' (2006) 35 C.L.W.R. 268, 296. 
66 [2017] UKSC 60, [63].  See also Barclays Bank plc v Various Claimants [2018] EWCA Civ 1670. 
67 In Yeung Mei Hoi, Cheung JA, it may be noted, made express reference to the discussion of policy in CCWS, 
and acknowledged the relevance of risk as a criterion in the close connection test: (n 48) 489. 
68  See also Plunkett (n 57): “Given that the enterprise liability justification merely requires there 
be some connection between the tort and the tortfeasor/defendant relationship, the court’s suggestion that it 
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The High Court of Australia remains opposed to a policy of strict liability based on notions of 
risk creation and enterprise liability.69  It is, however, unclear whether its alternative “occasion” 
test will prove easier to apply in practice.70 Goudkamp and Plunkett, for example, argue that 
the Australian analysis is overly focused on terminology at the expense of content and that a 
test of authority, power, trust, control and the ability to achieve intimacy is likely to make little 
sense in relation to negligence claims.71  What is clear, however, is that the High Court of 
Australia is not prepared to permit the courts a broad discretion to determine the relationship 
giving rise to vicarious liability and the scope of its cover.  In Prince Alfred College, it is 
seeking to keep control of the doctrine and the burden it places on employers and, in so doing, 
rejects risk-based reasoning as a justification for the imposition of strict liability.  Australia 
represents, then, a cautious approach, distrustful of judicial expansion of liability and a liability 
framework reliant on the existence of insured, deeper pockets defendants.  Scarred by an 
insurance crisis in the 2000s,72 which led to statutory reform of negligence law in Australia,73 
the Australian courts have refused to expand vicarious liability in contrast to the other common 
law jurisdictions covered in this article.   
Adoption of risk-based reasoning is not, therefore, a characteristic of the common law, but a 
decision of each jurisdiction whether it is appropriate in the light of its insurance framework 
and domestic policy framework.  It reflects a desire to ensure victims obtain compensation, 
particularly where the victims are vulnerable (Lister) or where policy suggests protection is 
needed (racist attacks in Mohamud; careless driving in Ming An).  It also naturally requires the 
courts to limit the ability of the defendant to obtain an indemnity from the tortfeasor, which 
vicarious liability, as a form of secondary liability, traditionally  allows.74  This has occurred 
in practice (in the UK due to a gentlemen’s agreement between insurers)75 except in the case 
of intentional torts. 76  Fundamentally, however, risk-based reasoning requires an acceptance of 





                                                          
somehow also provides guidance as to when that relationship will be sufficiently close is therefore misguided; at 
best, it simply restates the problem” at 560-561. 
69 Prince Alfred College v ADC (2016) 258 C.L.R. 134 at [82]. 
70  Commentators have been quick to query whether any meaningful difference can be found between the 
employment providing the “occasion” or “opportunity” for engaging in wrongdoing: see, for example, D. Ryan, 
‘From opportunity to occasion: Vicarious liability in the High Court of Australia’ [2017] C.L.J. 14, 17 and A. 
Gray, ‘Liability of Educational Providers to Victims of Abuse: A Comparison and Critique’ (2017) 39 Sydney Law 
Review 167. 
71 J. Goudkamp and J. Plunkett, ‘Vicarious liability in Australia: On the move?’ (2017) 17 O.U.C.L.J. 162, 167. 
This is true and it is not clear the test would apply in this context. 
72 See R. Davis, ‘The tort reform crisis’ (2002) 25 UNSWLJ 865; P. Cane, ‘Reforming Tort Law in Australia: A 
Personal Perspective’ (2003) 27 Melb U L Rev 649. 
73 Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Law of Negligence: Final Report (Canberra, 2002); B. McDonald, 
‘The Impact of the Civil Liability Legislation on Fundamental Principles and Policies of the Common Law of 
Negligence’ (2006) 14 T.L.J. 268.   
74 See Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] A.C. 555. 
75 See G. Gardiner, 'Lister v The Romford Ice and Cold Storage Company Ltd' (1959) 22 M.L.R. 652. 
76
 See K. Barker et al, The Law of Torts in Australia (5th ed., OUP, 2012) at 17.12; R. Glofcheski, Tort Law in 
Hong Kong (4th ed., Sweet and Maxwell, 2017) at 527. 
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3. Placing vicarious liability in comparative perspective: Civil law (France) 
Vicarious liability is not, however, solely a common law concept.  A civilian version (liability 
for the acts of others) may be found in art. 1242(5) of the French Civil Code (Code civil), whose 
wording (if not numbering) has been unchanged since 1804.77  This holds that “[m]asters and 
employers. . . [are liable] for the damage caused by their servants and employees in the 
functions for which they have been employed.” This model has been generally adopted by 
European systems which follow the Romanistic legal tradition, including Belgium 78  and 
Italy. 79   While this is not the only civilian model – German law relies on a rebuttable 
presumption of fault placed on the employer80- it is the dominant one.  Systems based on the 
Germanic legal tradition have tended over the 20th century to render it increasingly difficult for 
employers to rebut the presumption of fault.81  In practice, therefore, civilian systems have 
moved towards strict liability for the tortious acts of another.82  French law will be used as a 
representative civilian jurisdiction. 
 
The civilian law of tort (or delict) has, like the common law, changed over time.  Inevitably, 
provisions set down in a nineteenth century civil code have proved wholly inadequate to deal 
with the need for tortious intervention following the industrial revolution, mechanisation and 
significant societal and economic changes.  It was left, therefore, for the courts to develop 
principles of tort law based on the provisions of the code.  The result is that much of French 
tort law lies outside the Code civil.83   There has therefore been a long-standing need to 
consolidate case-law developments within the tort provisions of the Code itself.  Inspired by 
the reforms of French contract law in 2016,84 the French Ministry of Justice in March 2017 
published proposals to reform French tort law, following public consultation between April 
and July 2016.85  It is not, however, just a matter of bringing the Civil Code up-to-date to reflect 
the practice of the courts.  The Ministry has stated that: 
 
                                                          
77 Reforms in 2016 to the French Civil Code led to a renumbering of its articles.  Art. 1242(5) was formerly art. 
1384(5).  Again while liability for the acts of others extends beyond employer/employee liability e.g. parental 
liability for the torts of their children, this section will focus on the employer/employee relationship. 
78 Art 1384 III Code civil belge. 
79 Art 2049 Codice civile.   
80 Para 831(1), BGB: “A person who uses another person to perform a task is liable to make compensation for the 
damage that the other unlawfully inflicts on a third party when carrying out the task.  Liability in damages does 
not apply if the principal exercises reasonable care when selecting the person deployed and, to the extent that he 
is to procure devices or equipment or to manage the business activity, in the procurement or management, or if 
the damage would have occurred even if this care had been exercised”: https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_bgb/index.html (accessed 7 August 2018).  See also the Swiss Code of Obligations, art. 55; 
Spanish Civil Code art. 1903.  
81 See, for example, J. Fedke and U. Magnus, ‘Liability for damage caused by others under German law’ and M. 
Martin Casals and J.S. Feliu, ‘Liability for damage caused by others under Spanish law’ in J. Spier (ed), 
Unification of Tort Law: Liability for Damages Caused by Others (Kluwer Law International, 2003). 
82 See, generally, Spier ibid. 
83 See J-S Borghetti, ‘The culture of tort law in France’ (2012) 3 J.E.T.L. 158. 
84 Ordonnance of 10 February 2016 (now ratified by loi n° 2018-287 of 20 April 2018). See G. Helleringer, ‘The 
Anatomy of the New French Law of Contract’ (2017) 13 E.R.P.L. 355; S. Rowan, ‘The new French law of 
contract’ (2017) 66 I.C.L.Q. 805. 
85  Projet de réforme du droit de la responsabilité civile: http://www.textes.justice.gouv.fr/textes-soumis-a-
concertation-10179/projet-de-reforme-du-droit-de-la-responsabilite-civile-29782.html (accessed 7 August 2018).  
An excellent English translation exists, prepared by Professors Simon Whittaker of Oxford University and Jean-
Sébastien Borghetti of University of Paris II: 
http://www.textes.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/reform_bill_on_civil_liability_march_2017.pdf (accessed 7 August 
2018).   
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In addition to the process of consolidation, the avant-projet is responding to the legitimate expectations of personal 
injury victims by adopting a complete and coherent set of rules which will improve compensation for personal 




Changes therefore are being proposed for all aspects of French tort law, including that of 
vicarious liability. 
 
With this in mind, in this section I will examine liability under art. 1242(5) for the acts of others 
in French law.  In common with the systems reviewed above, French law requires: 
 
i. A relationship by which one person may be held liable for the harmful acts of others; 
ii. The commission of wrongdoing by the employee or subordinate; and 
iii. Liability which arises in the functions for which the employee/subordinate has been 
employed.  
 
This provision was originally based on a presumption of fault, albeit one that was irrebuttable 
in the case of masters and employers. The preparatory works for the Civil Code indicate that 
this article, in apparent conflict with natural law ideas of personal responsibility, was explicable 
as a matter of justice: “those on whom it is imposed can blame themselves, at the very least, 
for weakness, others for bad choices, all for negligence.”87  Subsequently, however, the courts 
came to accept that the provision should be viewed as based on strict liability. In the words of 
leading commentators, Viney, Jourdain and Carval: 
 
We will simply note that no-one today maintains, at least in France, that the liability of the employer is only 
explicable on the basis of fault, not even on the basis of a presumption of fault in the choice or supervision of his 
employees. . . [I]t is appropriate, in building a regime adapted to the needs of contemporary society, to consider 
the liability of the employer in a new light, considering it above all as a means of imputing to the business the 




The proposed changes to the Civil Code consolidate this change – vicarious liability is now 
found in a section entitled “The imputation of harm caused by another person” (L’imputation 
du dommage causé par autrui).  Liability under new article 1249 is expressly stated to be de 
plein droit, that is, strict liability. 
 
 
3.1 Determining the employer/employee relationship (lien de préposition) 
Clear parallels may be found between the French and common law approach towards the 
relationship requirement.  An employment relationship (lien de préposition) is said to exist 
when the employer (commettant) has the right to give the employee (préposé) orders or 
instructions how to do the work he or she is employed to do.89  While French law started with 
a test of control (subordination juridique),90 this too came to be challenged over time due to 
                                                          
86  http://www.textes.justice.gouv.fr/textes-soumis-a-concertation-10179/projet-de-reforme-de-la-responsabilite-
civile-traduit-en-anglais-30553.html (trans P Giliker). 
87 Attributed to Treilhard, who contributed to the drafting of the Civil Code, whose comments of 1803 are reported, 
in PA Fenet, Recueil complet des travaux préparatoires du Code civil, vol 13 (1827, reprinted 1968) 468 (trans P 
Giliker). 
88 G Viney, P Jourdain and S Carval, Les conditions de la responsabilité (4th edn, LGDJ, 2013) no 791-1 (trans 
P Giliker). See also P Jourdain, ‘La responsabilité du fait d’autrui à la recherche de ses fondements’ in: P Conte 
et al (eds), Mélanges Lapoyade-Deschamps (PU Bordeaux, 2003) 67. 
89 B. Fagès, Droit des obligations (7th ed., LGDJ, 2017) n° 398. 
90 The classic French case is Cass civ 4 May 1937, Dalloz 1937.363 (Veuve Meyer). 
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changes in working practices.  While the test based on authority and subordination remains 
(and such authority must be real and not merely apparent),91 more recent case-law has moved 
to a more flexible interpretation. The power to give instructions need not have a contractual or 
legal basis, but may simply exist as a matter of fact. Indeed, it is no longer necessary to prove 
that such a power has been exercised, provided that the employer (commettant) is deemed to 
possess authority over the employee (préposé).   This means that the term “préposé” (and note 
that it is not the more conventional salarié92 or employé) will extend to what a common lawyer 
would regard as an independent contractor.  In reality, then, the relationship of authority and 
subordination is one of form, rather than substance, with the courts examining whether the 
performance in question was for the purposes (and profit of) the employer.93  This will extend 
beyond traditional employment relationships to include relatives or casual acquaintances given 
a designated task.  On this basis, a wife can be the préposée of her husband.  A case of 1971 
illustrates this well.94  Here, a nurse running a first aid station asked a volunteer helper whom 
she knew did not have a driving licence to use her vehicle to run an errand.  The court had no 
difficulties in characterising this as a relationship where the volunteer was subject to the orders 
of the nurse and instructions in the manner of fulfilling a task designed to him, albeit without 
payment and on one single occasion. 
 
 
3.2 Determining the course of employment (dans les fonctions auxquelles les commettants 
les ont employés) 
Liability under article 1242(5) depends on the employee committing the tort “in the functions 
for which they have been employed.”  Concerns how broadly to interpret this phrase have 
troubled the French courts as much as those of the common law, notably in a series of cases 
between 1960 and 1988 which highlighted differences of views between the civil and criminal 
chambers of the French Supreme Court/Cour de cassation (criminal courts in France are able 
to award compensation for criminal wrongs).95  A key point of contention – which might sound 
familiar in view of the discussions above – was whether an abus de fonctions (abuse of 
function, that is, acting for the employee’s own ends) by the employee should block vicarious 
liability. The civil chambers, notably the second chamber, favoured a more restrictive approach 
to that of the criminal chamber, which excluded liability where the injury arose due to an abus 
de fonctions.   
 
The matter was only resolved by the Assemblée plénière of the Cour de cassation in its 
judgment of 19 May 198896 in a case involving employee fraud. The test stated is distinctive: 
liability for the acts of others will be presumed to exist unless the act of the employee is:  
 
(i) without authorisation (sans autorisation),  
(ii) for his own ends (à des fins étrangères à ses attributions) and  
(iii) outside the normal duties of his job (hors de ses fonctions). 
                                                          
91 Cass crim 15 February 1972, D 1972.368, JCP 1972 II 17159 note D Mayer, RTD civ 1973.350 obs G Durry. 
92 Who, as the term suggests, must receive a salary in return for his or her labour. 
93 See P. Giliker, ‘Vicarious Liability or Liability for the Acts of Others in Tort: A Comparative Perspective’ 
(2011) 2 J.E.T.L. 31, 42. 
94 Cass crim 25 May 1971, D 1971 somm 168. 
95 See, generally, J. Bell, S. Boyron and S. Whittaker, Principles of French Law (2nd ed., OUP, 2008) 368-373; 
Giliker (n 93) 51-54. 
96 Cass (Ass plén) 19 May 1988,D 1988.513 note C Larroumet, Gaz Pal 1988.2.640 concl M Dorwling-Carter, 




These three conditions are cumulative and if one is not fulfilled, then there is not an abus de 
fonctions and the employer is held liable.  Moreover, the case-law has generally adopted a 
narrow interpretation of these exoneratory conditions.  In a case with echoes of the common 
law, the Cour de cassation in March 2011 held an Institute for the Re-education of Young Deaf 
and Blind Children (IRSAM) liable under art. 1242(5) for a music teacher who had sexually 
abused his charges.  It had no link with his functions, but the abuse had taken place during his 
music lessons.  The Court found that the employee “had thus found in the exercise of his 
profession at his place of work and during his working hours the means to commit the fault and 
the opportunity to commit it” (« avait ainsi trouvé dans l’exercice de sa profession sur son lieu 
de travail et pendant son temps de travail les moyens de sa faute et l’occasion de la 
commettre »).97 
 
3.3 A civil law approach to vicarious liability? 
 
French substantive law thus resembles that found in UK and Hong Kong law.  We can see that 
civil law systems have also moved away from the traditional salaried employment relationship 
to a wider formulation which will ensure that victims obtain compensation from “employers”.  
Whilst advocates of risk theory such as Viney98 find the extension of the commettant/ préposé 
relationship acceptable, and stress that in most cases a traditional employment relationship will 
exist, this does not receive unanimous support.  Academics, such as Molfessis, have argued 
that: 
The Supreme Court seeks above all to find someone liable … it is guided by the need to achieve a result, rather 
than the concept … The case in point guides the solution reached, to the detriment of conceptual coherence.
99
 
The proposed reforms to the Civil Code indicate that little will change.  Art. 1249(1) provides 
that: 
An employer is liable strictly for harm caused by his employee. An employer is a person who has the power to 
give orders or instructions to his employee in relation to the performance of his functions.
100
 
Here the reforms opt for consolidation – and the current very broad notion of the employment 
relationship. 
The French courts have also adopted a generous test for course of employment.  In favouring 
the position of the criminal chamber, the May 1988 decision recognises the dominance of risk-
based reasoning in justifying the imposition of strict liability, here underpinned by the theory 
of risk-profit (théorie du risque-profit), that is, if you profit from another’s actions, you must 
accept the risks associated with these actions.  This theory is supported by a background of 
liability insurance and legislation which requires insurers to meet claims for damage caused by 
                                                          
97 Cass. civ. 2e, 17 March 2011, n° 10-14.468, Bull civ 2011, II, n° 69, JCP G 2011 1333, spéc n° 5 obs C. Bloch.  
See also Civ. 2e, 12 May 2011, n° 10-20.590, Bulletin civ 2011, II, n° 110. 
98 G Viney, P Jourdain and S Carval, Les conditions de la responsabilité (4th edn., LGDJ 2013). Fagès, in contrast, 
argues that the risque-profit rationale is only one of a number of competing justifications which include attributing 
the employee’s tort to the employer or imposing on the employer an obligation de garantie: (n 89) n° 398. 
99 See N. Molfessis, ‘La jurisprudence relative à la responsabilité des commettants du fait de leurs préposés ou 
l’irrésistible enlisement de la Cour de cassation, in: H Mazeaud/D Mazeaud/J-MOlivier/J-B Bladier (eds), 
Mélanges Gobert (Economica, 2004) 495, 504 and 512 (trans. P. Giliker). 
100 The translators (n 85) note that: “As will be seen from the definition in this provision, le commettant and le 
préposé are understood more widely than the English terms ‘employer’ and ‘employee’ which are normally 
restricted to the persons party to a contract of employment.” 
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both negligent and intentional misconduct for which the employer is held liable.  Art L121-2 
Insurance Code provides that the insurer shall cover the losses and damage caused by persons 
for whom the insured is legally liable pursuant to art 1242 of the Civil Code, regardless of the 
nature and seriousness of such persons’ faults. This is treated as having the status of d’ordre 
public and so cannot be modified by agreement.  Case-law has also limited the ability of the 
employer to obtain an indemnity from an employee – an employee is not subject to any personal 
liability except where, without authorisation, he acted for purposes alien to his attributions.101   
 
The May 1988 formula is reflected in art. 1249(3) of the reform proposal: “ An employer … is 
not liable if he proves that the employee acted outside the functions for which he was employed, 
without authorisation and for purposes alien to his attributions.”  Again we see a consolidation 
of existing law.  For a system without a formal system of precedent, the influence of the May 
1988 case is remarkable.  Such a formula, while iconic, does share, however, the weakness of 
the “close connection” test in that it is easy to state but still leaves the court with considerable 
discretion how to apply it.  What are “fins étrangères à ses attributions”?  Where exactly does 
liability end, particularly where the phrasing seems almost that of a defence to strict liability 
rather than part of the test itself?  Borghetti has argued that the dominant ideology of French 
law is victim-orientated, with an underlying assumption that most people will be insured.  In 
his view, such reasoning, while well-intentioned and supported by strong religious and 
philosophical convictions,102 can be simplistic – that strict liability should be encouraged as it 
ensures victim compensation.  He argues that insufficient consideration is made of its broader 
implications and that regard should be paid to issues such as the situation in which the victim 
is placed or the type of damage they have suffered.  Such doubts are not, however, reflected in 
the new tort proposals. 
 
4. Placing vicarious liability in comparative perspective: A hybrid socialist legal 
system in transition (China). 
China, as a mixed103 or hybrid104 legal system, offers a further perspective from a system in 
transition.  The 2009 Tort Liability Law (TLL) came into force from 1 July 2010105 and, as 
Thomas has noted, reflects the values of a country striving to move from a Socialist command 
economy to a modern economy driven by both exports and domestic demand.106  For Zhang: 
                                                          
101 This is the Costedoat ruling (Ass. plén. 25 févr. 2000, D. 2000. Jur.673, note Ph. Brun; JCP, 2000, éd. G. II, 
10 295, note M. Billiau), now encapsulated in the proposed art. 1249(4) of the reform proposals. Later case-law 
has clarified that an indemnity may still be obtained in case of criminal fault: Cousin (Ass. plén., 14 déc. 2001, D. 
2002, Jur. 1230, note J. Julien, Somm. 1317, obs. D. Mazeaud et 2117, obs. B. Thuillier; JCP 2002.II.10026, note 
M. Billiau). 
102 J-S Borghetti, ‘The culture of tort law in France’ (2012) 3 J.E.T.L. 158, 173-176. 
103 Such a classification, as Palmer readily accepts, is not unproblematic in that it lumps together systems with 
very little in common, such as Louisiana and Algeria, or Quebec and China, but it does highlight the narrowness 
of the common/civil law divide: V.V. Palmer, ‘Mixed Legal Systems... and the Myth of Pure Laws’ 67 La. L. Rev. 
(2007). 
104 See J. Husa, A New Introduction to Comparative law (Hart, 2015) who describes Chinese law as “a kind of 
hybrid between the Western regulations models, the traditional Chinese culture and socialist system”: 140. 
105 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qinquan Zerenfa, Tort Liability Law of the People’s Republic of China (2009). 
See, generally, H. Koziol and Y. Zhu, ‘Background and Key Contents of the New Chinese Tort Liability Law’ 
(2010) 1 J.E.T.L. 328 and D. Morgan, ‘The People's Republic of China Tort Liability Law 2009’ (2010) 26 P.N. 
219. 
106 K. Thomas, ‘The product liability system in China: Recent changes and prospects’ (2014) 63(3) I.C.L.Q. 755. 
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Adoption of the Torts Law is a significant step toward building a civil law infrastructure in China. As a hybrid of 
civil law tradition, common law concepts, and Chinese reality, the Torts Law establishes a legal framework under 
which civil wrongs are addressed and civil damages are compensated.107 
The overall approach of the TLL seems to be much more in line with the civil law tradition 
than it is with the common law.108  In common with civil law systems, case-law is not an official 
source of law, although judicial interpretations issued by the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) 
do, in practice, have binding authority and are followed by legal practitioners to clarify difficult 
civil law related issues.109 The 2009 Law builds on changes from 1978 onwards to enhance the 
Chinese legal system, culminating in the General Principles of Civil Law (GPCL)110 passed in 
1986 and the 2009 TLL.111  As Zhang has indicated,112 the GPCL (art 43) and relevant judicial 
interpretations offer recognition that, in Chinese law, an employer may bear tort liability for 
the damage caused by the employee at the time of performing working duties. 113  In so doing, 
Chinese law has moved towards an approach similar to that described above and, in so doing, 
has elected not to adopt the approach of German and Japanese law which it had followed in its 
1929 Civil Code and which allows an employer who has exercised due care in the selection 
and control of the employee to avoid liability.114  Article 34 of the TLL 2009 now provides 
that: 
(1) Where an employee of a work unit employer
115
 causes harm to others for the purpose of performing the work 
task, the work unit employer shall bear tort liability. 
(2) Where, during the period of labour dispatch, a dispatching employee causes harm to others in his performance 
of duties, the work unit supplying the dispatched employee, if at fault, shall bear the corresponding supplementary 
liability.116 
                                                          
107 M Zhang, ‘Tort Liabilities and Torts Law: The New Frontier of Chinese Legal Horizon’ (2011) 10 Richmond 
Journal of Global Law and Business 423, 494. 
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ideology, notably the exploitative nature of the employer-employee relationship:  C. Ding, ‘Development of 
Employer’s Vicarious Liability: A Chinese perspective’ (2014) 5 J.E.T.L. 67, 69. 
114 Art. 188 of the 1929 Civil Code provided: “The employer is jointly liable to make compensation for any 
damage which the employee wrongfully causes to the rights of another person in the performance of his duties.  
However, the employer is not liable for the damages if he has exercised reasonable care in the selection of the 
employee, and in the superintendence of the duties, or if the damage would have been occasioned notwithstanding 
the exercise of reasonable care.” 
115 This translation remains contentious – Koziol and Zhu (n 105) prefer the term “employing entity” (yongren 
danwei) instead of “employer” due to political considerations: 348.  See also Zhu (n 108) 350. 
116 Translation taken from Ding (n 113).  See also Article 35 which deals with a labour service relationship 
between individuals and aims to provide a framework for liability regarding auxiliaries of natural persons. In 
principle, vicarious liability is applicable to parties receiving services when the service provider causes damage 
to a third party in the course of providing services. Ding argues that the courts narrowly interpret the scope of 
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An employer, then, will be jointly liable for the tort committed by an employee during the 
course of employment.  The key elements observed in common and civil law systems are 
apparent: a labour relationship (which may be a written contract of service or a de facto labour 
relationship), and a tort (no limit is specified),117 which is committed “for the purpose of 
performing the work task”.  There is no provision for an employer indemnity from the 
employee, although Ding argues that the courts will have a discretion based on the facts of each 
case, notably in the presence of intentional fault or gross negligence, and highlights the 
existence of special laws providing for the employer’s right to indemnity for torts committed 
by certain professional employees.118  In terms of the relationship giving rise to vicarious 
liability, in China, most commentators see the rationale for vicarious liability resting on the 
element of control in the employment relationship.119  This exists when there is personal and 
economic dependency between the person qualified as employee and the employer.  Ding 
argues that the requirement of work-related tasks includes work authorised or instructed by the 
employer, in the apparent performance of these duties and which have an inherent connection 
with the performance of the authorised duties. 120   Bu agrees.  Content, time, place, the 
beneficiary of the conduct, the name in which the conduct is carried out and the connection 
between the conduct and the intention of the employer are all, Bu asserts, relevant factors in 
determining the existence of a work-related task. Even if the employee’s act exceeds the scope 
of authorisation, liability will extend to acts relating to the performance of the duties in 
question.121 In her comparative study, Ding asserts that current Chinese law now recognises 
employers’ vicarious liability in a manner akin to that in the West, but suggests, nevertheless, 
that insurance against employer’s vicarious liability in China is undeveloped and without 
Chinese employers purchasing insurance as a matter of course, the doctrine is likely to be 
confined within reasonable limits.122  Koziol and Zhu are less certain about this, arguing that 
art 34 leaves open many questions, notably to what extent vicarious liability will extend beyond 
the traditional employer/employee relationship.123 
 
This brief glance at Chinese law indicates that the economic reforms introduced in China have 
given rise to a need to deal with civil liability for torts committed by employees of business 
associations, especially private ones, notably in the context of personal injuries.  With 
economic and societal changes, litigation is becoming more common with a rise in the number 
of lawyers and a greater willingness to seek recourse in the courts with measures to protect 
                                                          
application of art. 35, excluding a labour service relationship where the individual labour service receiver has no 
control over the provider: at 83. 
117 Article 2 TLL 2009 provides: “Those who infringe upon civil rights and interests shall be subject to the tort 
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Translation found at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/cn/cn136en.pdf 
(accessed 7 August 2018). 
118 Ding (n 113) 92-96. 
119 Y. Bu, ‘Special types of torts’ in Bu (ed) (n 109) 150-151. 
120 Ding (n 113) 86, relying on ‘Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Concerning the 
Application of Law in Hearing Cases of Compensation for Personal Injury’  
Fa Shi [2003] No. 20 December 26, 2003, Article 9(2) which expands employers’ vicarious liability to include 
liability for intentional acts and gross negligence and defines “work-related task” as “a production or business 
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121 Bu (n 119) 151. 
122 Ding (n 113) 
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both consumers and workers and the less well-off generally.124  While insurance, as Ding 
indicates above, is not as prevalent as in Western jurisdictions, the compensation goal may 
nevertheless succeed when claims are brought against state-owned enterprises and wealthy for-
profit corporations.   Yet, in the absence of mandatory insurance requirements and/or a social 
practice of insuring against risks and an apparent reluctance to remove entirely the employer 
indemnity,  the Chinese doctrine is unlikely to embrace the broad risk justification seen in the 
UK and France.  Commentators have also noted that the notion of full compensation is not 
necessarily reflected in damages awards which will serve regulatory and public welfare goals 
apart from that of compensation.  It is important not to assume that a similar legal framework 
will give rise to similar results.  Green rightly terms the law “Tort law with Chinese 
characteristics”.125   
It is important for the comparatist, then, not to under-estimate the power of existing cultural 
values and, in particular, the historical, political and sociological norms of the Chinese state.  
Zhang and Bi, in a recent publication, comment that “the component of liability attribution is 
and will continue to be […] always influenced by culture, economics, politics”126 and, on this 
basis, we should avoid placing too much emphasis on the formal rules and assume them to be 
politically neutral.  De Lisle has remarked on the distinctive “public law” quality of Chinese 
tort law in which substantive provisions respond specifically to contemporary public policy 
issues, failures and controversies.127  On this basis, he argues: 
The differences between Chinese tort law and American common law (and other foreign) tort law remain 
substantial and appear rooted partly – although far from completely – in China’s and the US’s (and other systems’) 
relatively more and less ‘public’ conceptions of tort law.128 
If we see similarities with the systems previously addressed in this paper, then what does it 
mean in practice?  Zhang, in a fascinating study, has analysed, for example, the political 
influence held by tortfeasor groups, and the populist pressure aggregating against these groups 
in determining the orientation of tort law in China and highlights the need to understand the 
operation of tort law beyond the rules.129  Tort law exists in a specific context and this will 
impact on both the application of the rules and the reasoning which underlies their application. 
On the basis of the above analysis, the final section of this paper will explore the role of legal 
culture in shaping the principles of vicarious liability identified above and how a comparative 
perspective will aid our understanding and critical appreciation of the operation of the law of 
tort. 
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5. Why compare? Apples and oranges or an insight into law-making and legal 
culture? 
This paper has demonstrated that a common framework for vicarious liability in tort can be 
identified across different legal systems.  The key factors are: (a) a relationship – usually that 
of employment; (b) a tort; (c) committed in the exercise of the worker’s duties or tasks.  This 
transcends different legal traditions and can be seen in Chinese law following the tort law 
reforms of 2009.  To fully understand the operation of vicarious liability in tort, however, we 
need to go beyond the rules and consider “the law in action”.  The “law in the books” will only 
take us so far if we want to understand how vicarious liability operates and what motivates the 
courts in reaching decisions.  Oliphant, for example, has argued that, as a starting point, the 
culture of tort law embraces the following: societal attitudes towards tort law, the practice of 
tort law, the “lived experience” of those involved in tort claims, its institutional context and the 
cultural values embedded in substantive tort law.130 It is important, he argues, to examine “the 
attitudes, behaviour and experiences of ordinary people as well as those of legal elites, the deep 
structures of the tort system as well as its surface features, and what is taken for granted and 
overlooked as well as what is made explicit in standard accounts”.131  If we are to go beyond, 
then, comparing apples and oranges and gain a real understanding of the operation of this area 
of law, we need to contextualise our analysis. Nelken has described a study of legal culture as 
a “way of describing a relatively stable pattern of legally oriented social behaviour and attitudes 
… Like culture itself, legal culture is about who we are, not just what we do.”132  It is important 
also to acknowledge our own limitations as scholars, confined by our own experience, position 
and perspective, facing “the dilemma of understanding foreign cultures of law without being 
able to completely transcend the hermeneutic framework and cognitive matrix provided by the 
domestic culture.”133   Our own training, experience and social and political attitudes will 
therefore frame our understanding and conceptualisation of the law.  A comparative lawyer 
must therefore attempt to overcome these internal limitations as best as he or she can. With that 
in mind, what can a comparative study of vicarious liability in tort reveal about the operation 
of modern tort law and the institutional values it represents? 
In a study which encompasses common, civil and hybrid socialist legal systems from Europe, 
Australia, and China, a number of insights may be gained.  The first is one familiar to 
comparative lawyers.  To expect a clear delineation between common and civil law systems is 
inevitably naïve. The UK and Australian courts display distinct approaches to vicarious liability 
that indicate clearly that different policy choices are at stake.  In contrast, Hong Kong continues 
to show deference to the position of the UK courts with a particular focus on the domestic 
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concern of ensuring compensation for workers.  French law, in contrast, has openly adopted a 
generous approach based on the theory of risque-profit, albeit not accepted by all 
commentators, with recent proposed reforms to its Civil Code approving generous case-law 
development of both the relationship and course of employment elements of the doctrine.  
Chinese law is more difficult to analyse.  All commentators have noted since the late 1970s 
changes to Chinese legal culture and a growing emphasis on law in the population.134  The Tort 
Liability Law 2009 marks another step towards a more legalistic framework, but equally, as a 
hybrid socialist legal system moves towards recognition of vicarious liability, it must be 
questioned to what extent a market orientated approach is appropriate or even acceptable in 
this field.  Our snapshot of Chinese vicarious liability law in this paper will need further time 
to develop fully. 
What UK, Australian, French and Hong Kong law have in common is that vicarious liability is 
developing in the context of fully developed market economies in which industrialisation 
supported by a strong insurance industry has rendered strict liability of employers for the torts 
of their employees an acceptable means of loss distribution, safeguarding the interests of 
personal injury victims by ensuring they receive compensation from a solvent defendant.  
Chinese law is not yet in this position.  My study, however, does identify four factors as relevant 
to the development of vicarious liability across all legal systems: risk, insurance, personal 
injury, and the role of judges.  These will be examined in more detail below. 
(i) Risk 
In the recent decisions of the UK Supreme Court, enterprise risk-based reasoning has been 
dominant.  UK lawyers now resign themselves to the fact that extensions to vicarious liability 
can be easily justified by reference to such reasoning or by the even looser term of “social 
justice”.135  It is of interest that the reaction of the High Court of Australia has been one of 
caution, rejecting the approach of the UK Supreme Court on the basis that it represents an 
invitation to formulate policy rather than to search for principle.  In particular, the High Court 
of Australia has stated that “the risk-allocation … theory is based largely on considerations of 
policy, in particular that an employer should be liable for a risk that its business enterprise has 
created or enhanced. Such policy considerations have found no real support in Australia.”136  
As Lord Phillips indicated in CCWS,137  while the UK courts have yet to regard enterprise risk 
as the sole justification for vicarious liability, it is a powerful force, notably in relation to cases 
involving serious intentional torts such as sexual abuse.  Equally while the courts in Hong Kong 
seem to have adopted the UK language of “risk”, concerns have been raised that the courts are 
being unduly generous and that this is not necessarily a transplant which works readily in Hong 
Kong.  In France, however, the recent proposed reforms to the French Civil Code are happy to 
incorporate notions of risque-profit into the Code itself.  In terms of social justice, strict liability 
for the torts of others is justified in terms of risk-based reasoning and the question, then, is to 
provide a codified formula which will guide future courts.  While risk-based reasoning seems 
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to resonate in systems dominated by market economy concerns, it is of interest that the 
Australian courts continue to hold out against the force of this argument. 
(ii) Insurance 
The above picture, however, is meaningless unless we factor in the existence of insurance.  
Borghetti, for example, has highlighted the importance of widespread insurance (and 
acceptance of the need to insure) in encouraging the courts to extend French tort law to achieve 
its goal of victim compensation via loss spreading.138  Bell has noted the link between tortious 
liability and insurance in European legal development.139   By the 1930s, he observes an 
expansion of employers’ liability which he attributes to the capacity of a strong manufacturing 
sector to absorb losses and pass them onto customers combined with the now general 
availability of liability insurance (which had not been the case in the nineteenth century). The 
introduction of compulsory insurance in the twentieth century, for example for drivers and 
employers, has also created a framework within which private law can develop, confident that 
judgment may be met by an insured defendant.  Private insurance is, however, a feature of a 
market economy and it might be questioned to what extent such an insurance culture is 
developing in China.  It is also not decisive.  Insurance mechanisms exist in Australia and yet 
vicarious liability remains curtailed.  The bitter experience of Australia following the insurance 
crisis of 2000 which led to the statutory reform to limit tortious liability140 illustrates the fact 
that insurance comes at a price and this might not be a price the State is prepared to pay. 
(iii) Personal injury 
In many of the cases examined above, the concern of the court has been to ensure that personal 
injury victims obtain compensation.  In the UK case-law, vicarious liability was extended in 
cases such as Lister in circumstances where the victims of sexual abuse would have found it 
otherwise difficult to obtain compensation against an abusive employee long since dismissed.  
In France the proposed reforms to the Civil Code also place a special premium on the needs of 
personal injury victims.  They are vulnerable, in need of assistance, and when this is combined 
with tortious behaviour, then the question arises why is the law of tort not providing 
compensation?  Again, policy comes into play here.  While the principles of corrective justice 
have no problem in holding a tortfeasor liable for personal injuries caused to the victim by his 
or her wrongful conduct, they do indicate that holding a body which has committed no fault 
responsible in the law of torts needs to be justified.  This raises the key question: to what extent 
can (and should) a mere link between the tortfeasor and the employer be sufficient to justify 
liability?  What we see is consistency across legal systems that personal injury is a serious 
concern in the law of torts, but it does not alone justify targeting the deeper pockets of the 
employer to ensure victim compensation.  It is noticeable that the key cases discussed above 
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do all involve serious personal injuries.  At the very least the existence of personal injury seems 
to trigger the question: should vicarious liability apply here? 
(iv) The role of judges 
Finally, in isolating factors affecting the decisions of the courts, one key developmental 
element has been the willingness of judges to intervene in a manner they deem consistent with 
the societal values of the jurisdiction in question.  Here, the common law style of reasoning, in 
which judges set out their reasoning in their judgments, renders analysis more straightforward 
compared to the very different styles of civil law judgments which, in France, at least, are terse, 
often consisting of one or two sentences.141 It also goes without saying that the nature of 
judgments in China differs again,142 complicated by the fact that they have traditionally not 
been published as a matter of course, although Liu and Ren note China’s ongoing judicial 
reforms are aiming to (inter alia) improve the creditability and accessibility of court 
judgments.143  Common law judges, therefore, openly engage in policy debate, particularly at 
the higher level.  Lord Phillips, for example, in CCWS sets out five policy reasons which 
influence the courts in determining cases on vicarious liability.   Yet again we must not jump 
to conclusions.  The French courts, despite their short judgments, have developed ideas of risk 
to justify a large extension of strict liability under art. 1242 of the French Civil Code.  In 
contrast, the High Court of Australia in Prince Alfred College refused to engage with a 
discussion of policy, focussing instead on principle.  The Hong Kong courts have borrowed 
dicta from the UK courts, but without a detailed discussion of the policies involved (and have 
been criticised by commentators for exactly this reason).  What is clear, nevertheless, is that 
the framework for vicarious liability leaves much to the discretion of the courts in how they 
interpret the breadth and content of the tests stated.  This is regardless of legal tradition and of 
any codified formula.  This raises real questions as to the relationship between the courts and 
the State in terms of the determination of social policy.  Where there is a separation of powers 
between judiciary and State, to what extent are we content to allow the courts to formulate 
policies which, in their view, benefit society as a whole?  This is particularly problematic where 
there is no public consensus – the extent to which vicarious liability should be imposed on 
innocent employers being a good example –  and, in such circumstances, the courts must face 
the critical analysis of the legal community as a whole.  It is unsurprising in this light that the 
application of vicarious liability will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has set out the approach to vicarious liability in tort across a number of different 
legal systems.  Its scope has been wide: common and civil law; Europe/Australia/China; 
Western and socialist legal systems.  Nevertheless, it has identified a common framework for 
analysis.  This is not to be confused, however, with a common application of the rules.  Here, 
a comparative approach to legal analysis forces us to look beyond the legal framework and 
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recognise differences predicated on different attitudes towards tortious liability, influenced by 
socio-economic values expressed by the judiciary/State.  To learn from the experiences of 
others, we must first understand and appreciate the significance of broader meta-legal concerns 
such as insurance provision, attitudes to risk, the style of judicial reasoning, and the importance 
of compensation as a goal, notably in relation to personal injury claims, which underlie our 
legal experience.  This, indeed, is the value of a comparative study of vicarious liability which 
takes us beyond substantive law to an examination (and hopefully understanding) of the 
reasoning and policy choices adopted by the courts and State which underlie our modern law 
of torts. 
 
 
 
